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Abstract. Health IT, in addition to benefits can also have unintended consequences 
both in terms of operational and business risks. Understanding the dependencies 
between operator and manufacturer as well as issues that need to be addressed 
during procurement is essential to increase confidence in the operation of health IT. 
The paper provides the context, and a number of issues health IT operators such as 
clinical organisations, need to investigate during acquisition of health IT. 
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Introduction 
Adoption of IT in healthcare has offered new capabilities, while it has enhanced qualities 
of current capabilities, by offering increased processing power, storage, as well as 
automating mundane error-prone tasks. Adoption of health IT systems such electronic 
health records, picture archiving and communication systems, e-prescribing systems, as 
well as clinical decision support systems, have offered a number of advantages, including 
improvements in quality and safety of health services [1]. However, increasing reliance 
on IT may result in operational challenges, as even seemingly unimportant failures may 
have repercussions. For example, consider printers in a clinical organisation going 
offline for a limited period of time, and the impact of such an event on operations; in 
addition to the increased workload this may result in errors, with potential effect on the 
safety of the patients.  
There are examples of many inconspicuous failures, which result in patient hazards, 
due to causes such as technical failures, badly designed user interfaces, mismatch 
between system interfaces and poor training. These reflect the fact that IT depended 
complex services constitute socio-technical systems [2]. Health IT operating 
organisations, need to include measures (assurances) that will provide confidence that 
these failures are controlled (e.g. use of paper based back up procedures, exhaustive 
testing of IT that will identify the majority of defects, comprehensive user training). 
When acquiring health IT, clinical organisations need to identify the strategy that will 
result in operating the contracted health IT with confidence.  
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1. What it means for a health IT operator to define critical requirements 
In many critical industries, such as aerospace and energy, manufacturers and operators 
of computer systems, often have the onus to be in 
a position to convincingly demonstrate that their 
operation is fit-for-purpose. This involves 
gathering and explaining evidence through 
analysis and testing, that they have unintended 
use, and that these unintended conditions have 
been controlled to acceptable levels [3]. The 
operator of an IT system has ultimate 
responsibility for the safety and operational 
assurance of their services, as IT is an integral 
component of interdepending structures such as 
other systems, and people governed by a set of 
procedures and policies. Similarly, when 
contracting health IT, the operator (such as 
clinical organisations) will need to identify the 
aspects of its operation that may be critical to the 
safety and quality of the offered service (Figure 1). 
Usually these can refer to unintended conditions 
such as failures, or wanted qualities (e.g., patient 
record not found, or patient images should be 
made available to clinicians within X time). These 
critical aspects will then be expressed as 
requirements during procurement of the health IT 
system (both examples represent real cases that 
have affected the safety of patients). 
 
It is not uncommon for some of these 
requirements to be implemented by the clinical 
organisations’ ‘in-house’ development team, offering a customised solution. In many 
cases, though, the organisation will contract the IT system from a manufacturer that will 
then assume responsibility in implementing the requirements discharged to them. In both 
cases, the respective development teams will need to produce the information necessary 
to support the requirements related to the critical aspects of the system’s operation. This 
can include analysis, code walkthroughs, as well as white and black box testing, 
depending on the criticality of the service the system is contributing to. Furthermore, 
even if IT is developed in-house, it should be noted that IT developers may not be 
familiar with the operational needs of a system, for the expression of which, clinicians 
may be best suited. Separating the operational (what the system will do) from the 
technical (how it will be developed), allows separation of concerns and concentration of 
expertise at the right places. However, it is very important for an organisation to 
understand and manage these dependencies, as they can result in operational, safety, 
security, as well as business risks. Direct mismatch between requirements, as well as 
assumptions about these requirements will result in a system that does not correspond to 
the operational needs of an organisations. There are strategies helping to reduce the 
likelihood of these mismatches by identifying and documenting tacit knowledge; for 
example the UK ISB 0129 suggests a clinical advisor for IT manufacturers.  
 
Figure 1. Operational and technical 
viewpoint dependencies 
2. Auditing the manufacturer in order to increase confidence 
An organisation that contracts an IT system needs to understand how their operational 
dependencies map on the manufacturer’s development process and product in advance. 
Failure to do so may result in the operating organisation making assurance claims about 
the IT system, which eventually cannot be supported by the manufacturer. The following 
is a (non-exhaustive) list of issues that the authors consider may compromise the 
assurance efforts of the operator.  
2.1. Compliance with standards and independent review 
A manufacturer’s compliance with standards will provide assurances that a known, 
trusted set of methods and processes has been used. However this does not guarantee the 
quality of the product of these processes, for which evidence gathered from testing will 
need to be provided. An operator can ask for a compliance statement and assessment, 
which in certain cases can be provided by an independent reviewer. 
2.2. Training and support requirements 
Training requirements can be underestimated, as there can be many implicit assumptions 
that if not true, may invalidate safety critical measures. For example, often issues raised 
from switching off alarms due to alarm fatigue, or overriding restrictions of the software 
may be attributed, in addition to poor design, to training or lack thereof. Furthermore, 
users of a system may need periodic training, or training after an update, in which case a 
more permanent agreement of support may offer benefits.  
2.3. Field evidence and reporting 
A manufacturer that has a structured reporting process is more likely to create a tracked 
operational record about their IT system. A clinical organisation may need to clarify if 
they have access to that data, also being notified in case an operator discovers a dormant 
issue with the system.  
2.4. Adequacy, suitability and visibility of evidence and testing  
An operator should not take the claims of a manufacturer about meeting the discharged 
to them requirements at face value. The operator should ask for a convincing but also 
suitable explanation. Compliance to standards, such as the CE mark and the Medical 
Device Directive (when applicable), as well as ISBs 0160 [5] and 0129 [4] in the UK, 
assists to this task. Standards stipulate techniques that experience has shown are suitable 
for certain problems. Furthermore, it should be noted that operators may prefer to explore 
options regarding visibility to the available evidence, rather than settle with a mere 
reference provided to it. However, if this is not an option, independent review and 
certification may warrant acceptance of appeal to a non-disclosed body of evidence. 
2.5. Explanation of achievement of requirements  
In many cases, there may be a logical leap between evidence, testing results and 
discharged requirements. Organisations, contracting IT systems, should consider asking 
for a documented explanation on how the testing results provide assurance that the 
requirements have been met, and under what specific assumptions.  
2.6. Maintenance and update process 
These are two very important issues, which may compromise the critical measures set in 
place by the operator. Maintenance and updates may affect the way a system is 
configured or a function is provided, whilst the operator is unaware (particularly in 
automated software updates). Operators should ask for an update changelog and assess 
whether updates will affect the operational dependencies and assumptions.  
2.7. Access to API and technical dependencies 
Particularly for organisations that combine an IT system with in-house development, 
there may be a requirement to have access to the API, as well as access to other interface 
and knowledge of the technologies used.  
2.8. Tacit knowledge extraction and customisation 
Manufacturers should try to understand the operations of each organisation and how their 
IT relates to them; they should not offer a fits-all solution. Standards, such as the ISB 
0129 [4], ask the manufacturer to involve a clinical expert in the process of procurement 
and customisation. Such experts will be able to elicit and elaborate on the justification of 
certain requirements, by providing a clear understanding how they are relevant to critical 
aspects of the system’s operation in situ. Although this helps, clinical organisations have 
different procedures, thus a system that may be suitable for one may cause problems to 
another. The manufacturer should go through a structured process of eliciting this tacit 
operational information and suggest customisation to the operator. This can be very 
challenging, if not agreed during procurement, as any customisation of the system and 
its services may involve increased cost.  
Conclusions 
Health IT has become an integral part of many clinical services as it provides 
numerous benefits to organisations. An organisation procuring, contracting (even 
developing in-house), health IT systems needs to understand how the development can 
affect the confidence they can have in the operation of the health IT system. A number 
of issues need to be considered during procurement that might constitute business risks, 
which could result in overspending if realised late. The paper has presented issues, which 
can be used by clinical organisations, to audit the fitness of manufacturers to offer 
confidence in the safe operation of the health IT system about to be acquired. Although 
the list is non-exhaustive the authors have identified prominent issues based on their 
experiences; further work needs to result in a more comprehensive framework.   
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